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Abstract
Background: Despite increased access to treatment and reduced incidence, vertical transmission of HIV continues to 
pose a risk to maternal and child health in sub-Saharan Africa. Performance-based financing (PBF) directed at healthcare 
providers has shown potential to improve quantity and quality of maternal and child health services. However, the ways 
in which these PBF initiatives lead to improved service delivery are still under investigation. 
Methods: Therefore, we implemented a longitudinal-controlled proof-of-concept PBF intervention at health facilities and 
with community-based associations focused on preventing vertical transmission of HIV (PVT) in rural Mozambique. 
We hypothesized that PBF would increase worker motivation and other aspects of the workplace environment in order 
to achieve service delivery goals. In this paper, we present two objectives from the PBF intervention with public health 
facilities (n = 6): first, we describe the implementation of the PBF intervention and second, we assess the impact of the 
PBF on health worker motivation, key factors in the workplace environment, health worker satisfaction, and thoughts 
of leaving. Implementation (objective 1) was evaluated through quantitative service delivery data and multiple forms of 
qualitative data (eg, quarterly meetings, participant observation (n = 120), exit interviews (n = 11)). The impact of PBF 
on intermediary constructs (objective 2) was evaluated using these qualitative data and quantitative surveys of health 
workers (n = 83) at intervention baseline, midline, and endline.
Results: We found that implementation was challenged by administrative barriers, delayed disbursement of incentives, 
and poor timing of evaluation relative to incentive disbursement (objective 1). Although we did not find an impact 
on the motivation constructs measured, PBF increased collegial support and worker empowerment, and, in a time of 
transitioning implementing partners, decreased against desire to leave (objective 2). 
Conclusion: Areas for future research include incentivizing meaningful quality- and process-based performance 
indicators and evaluating how PBF affects the pathway to service delivery, including interactions between motivation 
and workplace environment factors. 
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Implications for policy makers
• The collective goals and incentives associated with performance-based financing (PBF) led to improved teamwork and empowered health 
workers to overcome systemic barriers, although care must be taken to address non-contributors.
• PBF interventions should incentivize meaningful quality, process, and service indicators that reflect behaviors within health workers’ control.
• Well-timed longitudinal mixed methods evaluation of impact of PBF on and interactions between workplace factors are necessary to better 
ascertain how PBF leads to changes in service delivery.
Implications for the public
Health workers in low-resource settings are critical in delivering healthcare to vulnerable populations. Mechanisms to support worker motivation, 
engagement, and retention are important to the functioning of these health systems, and financing based on incentivizing worker and health system 
performance is one such mechanism. We found that in rural Mozambique, performance-based financing (PBF) led to increased teamwork and 
empowerment and buffered against desire to leave. Careful implementation of well-monitored PBF interventions has the potential to encourage 
health workers to more deeply engage with their colleagues, patients, and workplace.
Key Messages 
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Introduction
Performance-based financing (PBF) has been cautiously 
embraced as a strategy to improve delivery of health services 
in low- and middle-income countries.1-4 Here we use 
Renmans and colleagues’ definition of PBF as “an incentive 
scheme directed to health providers (facilities and/or health 
workers), but accompanied by a new level of autonomy of 
the health facility (eg, to decide on the use of resources), 
increased monitoring, and a separation of functions between 
the purchaser, provider and/or the newly created verification 
officer of health services.”5 PBF purportedly works by 
aligning the motivation of health workers with that of the 
health system, a reflection of principle-agent theory.6 In 
the early decades of PBF, this definition of motivation was 
not challenged7 nor explicitly measured.8 However, interest 
in better understanding the pathway between PBF and 
service delivery performance was ignited by a Cochrane 
review reporting that variation in PBF design and lack of 
process analysis of these context-dependent studies made it 
impossible to assess general PBF effectiveness.9 Since then, 
increased ethnographic evaluation of PBF10 and contextual 
analysis has advanced our understanding of the value of each 
component of the PBF intervention.5
Improving health worker motivation is the foundation of PBF. 
Motivation is “an individual’s degree of willingness to exert and 
maintain an effort towards organizational goals.”11 Motivation 
has long been classified as intrinsic, or generated by internal 
forces (eg, altruism, self-improvement), versus extrinsic, 
or generated by forces external to the self (eg, recognition, 
rewards).12 In low-resource health systems where health 
workers experience low remuneration and challenging work 
environments (eg, poor infrastructure, weak management, 
high workload), extrinsic motivation is at risk of being low13,14 
and health systems may depend upon workers’ intrinsic 
motivation to care for their community and a sense of duty to 
fulfil their role.15 While the ethics and sustainability of relying 
on intrinsic motivation, particularly in the context of task-
shifting to community-based health workers, has been called 
into question,16 concern for “crowding out” health workers’ 
intrinsic motivation with financial incentives has been a 
greater concern.17 However, Lohmann and colleagues have 
proposed a conceptual framework that moves beyond the 
dichotomous intrinsic vs. extrinsic perspective of motivation 
and instead recognizes the multiple sources, origins, and 
regulations of motivation that influence an individual health 
worker.7 This framework is grounded in self-determination 
theory and fits more clearly within multidimensional PBF 
initiatives that simultaneously target multiple aspects of work 
motivation.7 
Examination of health worker motivation in low-resource 
health systems prompts discussions about attrition. There is 
a severe shortage of skilled health workers in sub-Saharan 
African health systems: 20% and 10% of African-born 
physicians and nurses, respectively, work overseas18 and 
more have migrated elsewhere within the continent or have 
left the public health system for jobs with higher pay and 
more professional development opportunities in the non-
governmental organization (NGO) or private sectors.19 This 
turnover represents not only the substantial lost return on 
investment of the time and money required to train and retrain 
workers,20 but also interruptions of service delivery.21 Job 
satisfaction is the positive affective orientation an employee 
holds towards the organization that employs them22 and is 
inversely correlated with intention to leave.23 Job satisfaction 
is strongly related to motivation24 and can be positively 
impacted by PBF initiatives.25 However, the impact of PBF on 
workers’ thoughts of leaving, desire to leave, and attrition has 
been understudied. 
Despite recent successes in increased access to maternal 
antiretroviral therapy, early testing and treatment for infants 
and young children, and reduced incidence rates, vertical 
transmission of HIV still poses risk to maternal and child 
health, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.26 In 2015, 150 000 
children were infected by HIV, the vast majority through 
vertical transmission.27 Early evidence of PBF impact from the 
large, well-designed intervention in Rwanda has shown PBF 
to increase on HIV testing28 and key maternal and child health 
indicators, including quantity and quality of antenatal care 
and number of facility births and child preventative visits.29 
Following this, PBF was proposed as a means to support the 
scaling up of preventing vertical transmission of HIV (PVT) 
services while motivating health workers through monetary 
and non-monetary incentives.30 A recent systematic review 
of impacts on HIV/AIDS services found PBF was associated 
with reduced patient drop-out and treatment failure but 
failure to clearly replicate results necessitates further 
validation.31 Challenges to implementation of national PVT 
policies and best practices are numerous at the point of care32 
and are linked with delivery of the specific services critical 
to PVT.33,34 However, evaluation of the implementation of 
PBF interventions and the impact of PBF on intermediary 
constructs in the context of PVT are lacking. 
We therefore tested a proof-of-concept PBF intervention with 
the overarching goal of increasing the number of PVT services 
delivered at health facilities in rural Mozambique. This paper 
focuses on two complementary study objectives. The first is 
to describe the implementation of the intervention, inclusive 
of incentive use. The second objective is to assess how PBF 
affects health worker motivation, key factors in the workplace 
environment, and health worker satisfaction and thoughts of 
leaving their position. 
Conceptual Framework
Our study design is grounded in the Motivation-Opportunity-
Ability framework, which comes from the human resources 
and operations management literature35 and posits that all 
three of domains must be present to elicit the desired behavior 
to occur.36 We have defined motivation above and opportunity 
as the many contextual factors that enable or constrain the 
desired behavior action. Ability encompasses the skills 
and knowledge to execute action. Our previous work has 
identified that the range of factors in the opportunity domain 
is most limiting, and that knowledge, particularly in PVT, 
was not limiting32,37 Therefore, we focus on the intermediary 
workplace environment constructs as representative of the 
opportunity domains in addition to the motivation this is still 
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central to PBF. 
In light of this theory, we created a conceptual framework 
to guide the implementation and evaluation of the PBF 
intervention (Figure 1). Engaging stakeholders in the 
intervention design, specifically in goal setting, is key to 
effectively priming health workers’ autonomous loci of 
motivation38 and is the starting point for this intervention’s 
conceptual framework (Figure 1). PBF was initially 
hypothesized to primarily work through increasing health 
workers’ extrinsic motivation (eg, remuneration, social 
recognition) to lead to a desired action,2 with collective 
extrinsic motivation increasing collegial support towards 
goal achievement. However, more recent literature recognizes 
that the PBF package affects many other aspects of a 
health worker’s workplace environment, and that these are 
interrelated. For example, increased monitoring may lead 
to increased or improved supervision and administrative 
support39; increased autonomy may lead to a sense of 
ownership and empowerment7; and these and new facility 
resources may interact with extrinsic motivation to affect 
intrinsic motivation and job satisfaction.7,25 
Our PBF intervention involved both facility-based health 
workers and community volunteers. We hypothesized that 
PBF would work through these motivation, workplace 
environment, and job satisfaction constructs to lead facility-
based workers to improve quality of service delivery and lead 
to increased number of services delivered at the facility (Figure 
1). Similarly, we posited that PBF would increase number of 
community services delivered by volunteers, including referral 
for facility-based care, and therefore contribute to increased 
demand for facility-based services. Since health workers’ 
experiences of prior outcomes affect effort they invest in 
similar situations,11 we expected that the effects of the PBF on 
workplace environment and incentives earned each quarter 
(including the process of disbursement) will affect how strong 
the PBF is as a “treatment” in the subsequent quarter.
Methods
Study Setting
This research was conducted from July 2012-August 2014 in 
two districts in northern Inhambane province, Mozambique. 
At that time in Mozambique, the HIV prevalence among 
women of reproductive age was the fifth-highest globally 
at 16%, women dropped out at each step of the cascade of 
PVT services, and 12% of children born to women living 
with HIV/AIDS contracted the infection through vertical 
transmission.40,41 Furthermore, Mozambique continues to 
experience a severe shortage of health workers,42 which is 
problematic for PVT because maternal and child health nurses 
and midwives provide the majority of these services.
During the period of formative work and intervention design 
(July 2012-July 2013),37 CARE International provided funding 
and technical support for HIV prevention and treatment for 
the districts as the PEPFAR-implementing partner. During 
intervention implementation (August 2013-July 2014), the 
Center for Collaboration for Health, a Mozambican NGO new 
to these districts, transitioned into the role of the PEPFAR-
implementing partner. 
Intervention Design 
The intervention district was selected based on perceived 
readiness by CARE and interest of the District Health 
Authority. Three health facilities (one large health center 
in the district capital, one large health center peripheral to 
the district capital, one small health center) were selected 
for implementation of the PBF intervention (Table S1, see 
Supplementary file 1). The comparison district was matched 
based on geographic and administrative similarities, and three 
facilities in this district were roughly matched for similarities 
in their catchment areas and workforce. Community 
volunteer associations in the two districts were also engaged 
in the PBF intervention,43 but the results are beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
Our participatory approach to intervention design began 
with an 8-month formative assessment of the barriers that 
health workers experience in delivering PVT services and 
the appropriateness of PBF to address them.37 Following the 
formative assessment, repeated meetings with intervention 
health centers, district authorities, and health system 
implementing partners were held to discuss, debate, and design 
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework for a PBF Intervention With Facility-Based Health Workers to Increase the Quantity of Services Delivered to Prevent 
Vertical Transmission of HIV in Rural Mozambique. Abbreviation: PBF, Performance-based financing.
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the intervention. The intervention district’s senior health 
administrator also visited another district in Mozambique 
with an on-going performance-based financing intervention 
to learn about challenges and facilitators to implementation. 
Goal Setting
The five indicators that were chosen represented all women 
and women living with HIV only and spanned the PVT 
service cascade: number of all women (1) and women living 
with HIV (2) attending first antenatal care visit; number of 
all women (3) and women living with HIV (4) delivering 
at health facility; and number of children exposed to HIV 
attending child preventative health visits (5). These indicators 
were suggested by the research team in design meetings with 
intervention district health authority and facility leaders 
because they are indicators used for facility- and district-level 
goals and reporting. The indicators were were agreed to by 
facility leaders, health workers, and district administrative as 
they aligned with current focus.
Facility-specific goals for each indicator were set by taking 
the monthly mean for each indicator for the previous year 
and then increasing it by 10%. Setting goals as a proportion 
of baseline measures builds on existing capacity and has 
been used in other results-based financing initiatives.2 This 
approach created challenging but realistic goals that allowed 
scaling for facilities with differently-sized patient populations. 
Incentives
The total budget for facility-based incentives for the three 
intervention facilities was US$18 000 or $4500/quarter. The 
quarterly budget was approximately ¼ of each worker’s 
monthly salary, so that over the year of implementation the 
maximum total financial incentive would be equivalent to one 
month’s salary for all health workers. This quarterly budget was 
allocated to the three intervention facilities in proportion to 
the number of workers and their respective salaries at the time 
of the intervention planning phase (Table 1). For reference, a 
nurse’s monthly salary at the time was US$350. 
An additional 5% of total health facility incentives (US$900) 
was allocated as incentives to engage the District Health 
Authority in supporting health facilities. These incentives 
would be awarded based upon the mean percent of goals 
achieved each quarter across the facilities.
Evaluation
The five indicators were assessed quarterly in both the 
intervention and comparison districts, with the proportion of 
goals achieved based on the monthly mean for that quarter. 
Service delivery data were initially planned to be collected at 
the worker and patient levels. However, resource limitations 
and concerns about data completion precluded this approach 
and service delivery was reported at the facility level, with 
n = 6 health facilities. 
The research team calculated proportion of goal achieved 
for each quarter and then held a meeting with each facility 
to review quarterly performance and challenges encountered. 
At intervention facilities, the amount of incentives earned 
and priorities for spending the earned incentives were also 
discussed. 
Zero to 100% of the PBF funds were awarded based on 
quarterly goal achievement. Funds were to be disbursed to 
the District Health Authority using processes modified from 
CARE’s existing PEPFAR mechanisms. In order to receive 
the incentives, each facility was to prepare a solicitation of 
funds to the district and then the district administrator would 
generate a bank check. A justification of expenditures was 
required before the next quarterly transfer could occur.
Use of Funds
Each facility created a committee with the autonomy to decide 
how to use the incentives earned by the facility each quarter. 
During intervention development, committees expressed 
interest in splitting earned incentives evenly between 
individuals and the facility. Of note, committees decided 
that all facility workers irrespective of job description were 
eligible to receive personal incentives because all staff, from 
the lead physician to janitor, contributed to creating a positive 
environment that would help retain patients in the cascade of 
PVT services. 
Data Collection
Implementation: Quantitative Service Delivery Data
The research team sought to streamline data collection by 
using the existing data collection processes; the Center for 
Health Collaboration (the PEPFAR-implementing partner) 
independently checked original paper records against monthly 
reports submitted by health facility (Figure 2). Service 
delivery data were extracted from these reports, entered into 
Excel 2011 (Microsoft, Seattle, WA), and imported into Stata 
v14 (StataCorp LP, College Station, TX) for analyses.
Intermediary Constructs: Quantitative Motivation and Workplace 
Environment Surveys
Instruments. Motivation, workplace environment factors, 
and thoughts of leaving were evaluated longitudinally using 
a survey at intervention baseline, midline, and endline 
Table 1. Quarterly Maximum Incentive Amount Per Health Facility and the District Health Authority in the Intervention District of the PBF Intervention
Unit Number of Health Workers Maximum Incentive Funds Per Quarter (US$)
Large health center in district capital 52 $2910.00
Large health center peripheral to district capital 22 $1250.00
Small health center peripheral to district capital 4 $340.00
District health authority 5 $225.00
Total 83 $4725
Abbreviation: PBF, Performance-based financing.
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(Figure 1). Constructs from our formative work were 
compared to two known tools to capture health worker 
motivation: a questionnaire for community health workers 
used in Haiti and Zimbabwe44-46 and a tool developed to 
measure motivation among hospital workers in Kenya.47 The 
community health worker questionnaire used by Mbuya and 
colleagues captured the vast majority of constructs from our 
formative work and was thus selected as the basis for our 
survey.44 We modified survey language to more clearly reflect 
the facility-based health cadres being interviewed and the 
deletion of three questions that referred to home-based care 
(Supplementary Material 1).
The survey questions captured the constructs in our 
conceptual framework (Figure 1; 87 questions) as well 
additional constructs to monitor unintended consequences 
on time spent (11 questions), workload (5 questions), and 
other key aspects of workplace environment (eg, training, 
3 questions; PVT knowledge, 15 questions). Knowledge 
questions were asked at baseline and endline only, and those 
on goals and incentives (11 questions) were asked at endline 
only. Questions on incentives were only asked of workers 
at intervention facilities. Response options were given on a 
1-5 Likert-type scale (eg, never, rarely, sometimes, usually, 
always). 
The survey was adapted to be specific to each facility worker 
type (eg, maternal and child health nurses, other clinicians, 
non-clinicians), translated into Portuguese, and back-
translated into English. Experts in the local language Xitswa 
helped standardize the best oral translations from written 
Portuguese. Research assistants who conducted the surveys 
were native or fluent speakers in Portuguese and Xitswa 
and had prior experience in research or as community HIV 
counselors. Surveys were piloted with health workers in a 
similar, neighboring district not involved in the intervention 
and then finalized. 
Participants. We invited all workers at the small peripheral 
facilities and 63% of workers at the other facilities (all maternal 
and child health nurses and midwives, representatives of 
other departments who were chosen based on departmental 
seniority). Only five health workers that were successfully 
contacted declined to participate, citing time constraints. The 
majority of participants filled out the surveys independently 
Figure 2. Data Collection Timeline for the PBF Intervention Implementation and Evaluation. Abbreviation: PBF, performance-based financing.
and subsequently reviewed their completed survey with a 
member of the research team for quality control. Others were 
asked the survey questions by the enumerator,
Implementation and Intermediary Constructs: Qualitative 
Data Collection 
Participant observation. Ethnographic observation occurred 
at longitudinal planning meetings, quarterly performance 
review meetings, regular phone contact, and unstructured 
observation at health facilities (Figure 2). These were recorded 
in detailed handwritten notes in Portuguese and English. 
Notes were typed and compiled into an electronic notebook 
daily. 
Exit interviews. Key stakeholders from both districts (eg, 
district health administrators, facility leaders, health workers) 
were invited to participate in semi-structured interviews at 
the end of the intervention. Participants were asked about 
their perceptions of the intervention in discrete steps, from 
design through incentive disbursement. Questions probed 
facilitators, challenges, and suggested improvements for the 
PBF intervention design and implementation (Supplementary 
Material 2). Interviews were conducted in Portuguese and 
took 55-75 minutes to complete. 
Data Analysis
Implementation: Quantitative Analysis of Goal Attainment
The non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney was used to 
assess differences in goal attainment status (yes, partial, no) 
for total proportion of goals achieved and survey questions 
only asked at endline. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney was also 
used to compare demographic characteristics among survey 
and exit interview participants. 
Reducing Variables Into Motivation and Workplace Environment 
Factors
Intermediary constructs: Quantitative analysis. We used factor 
analysis with an oblique rotation for correlated factors to 
reduce survey questions into salient constructs, preserving 
factor loadings >0.4. We made exceptions for factor loadings 
>0.3 if the item was strongly conceptually related to the 
construct. We checked the internal consistency of factors 
using Chronbach α >0.7 for all workers together and by 
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intervention and comparison status, and made four exceptions 
for factors with Chronbach α >0.55 for all workers together in 
cases where the factors were strongly aligned with findings 
from our formative work (Table S2, see Supplementary file 
1). Chronbach α can underestimate reliability and is thus 
considered the “lower bound” of reliability if multiple traits 
underlie scale items48 and cannot be considered an absolute 
confirmation of scale reliability. Composite scores for multi-
item constructs were created by summing item values and 
dividing by the number of items. 
Separate mixed effects models were used to test the impact 
of PBF on each of motivation, workplace environment, job 
satisfaction, and desire to leave constructs (objective 2) at 
the level of the health worker. Treatment (PBF), time, and 
the treatment*time interaction were modeled as fixed effects, 
the health facility as a random effect, and the construct as 
the outcome. Linear contrasts were used to test differences 
in construct Likert-type scores between intervention 
and comparison facilities between baseline and endline 
(objective 2). 
Post-hoc power analysis. The sample size for the quantitative 
survey analysis was limited by the number of health workers 
at each clinic. For analysis of the psychometric variables 
measured on the Likert scale of 1-5, we assumed an intra-
class correlation of 0.05 since workers at the same facilities 
may be similarly influenced by facility-level factors. Using the 
baseline number of health workers (intervention n = 37 and 
comparison n = 27), we calculated a design effect of 1.57 for 
intervention workers and 1.40 for comparison workers. This 
lead to a 60% power to detect a large effect size of 0.7. 
Implementation and Intermediary Constructs: Qualitative 
Data Analysis
Audio recordings of meetings were used to augment 
handwritten notes. Audio recordings of the exit interviews 
were transcribed in Portuguese and translated into English. 
Two members of the research team independently coded 
the exit interviews using thematic analysis according to the 
principles of frequency, universality, differentiation, and 
emphasis.49
Results
Participants 
Data on key PBF constructs were collected from facility health 
workers and district administrators through participant 
observation, longitudinal surveys, and exit interviews (Table 
2). A total of 49 unique health workers in the intervention 
district and 34 unique workers in the comparison district 
participated in the longitudinal survey, with 55% participating 
in all three timepoints and 28% in two timepoints. The health 
workers participating in the survey were predominantly 
female (63%) and 30 years of age on average (Table 3). The 
two significant demographic differences were that in the 
intervention district, clinicians had a median of 9.5 more 
months of work experience (27.5 months vs 18 months for 
workers at comparison facilities) and that workers spoke 
one language less on average than those in the comparison 
district. 
A total of 11 (n = 8 intervention, n = 3 comparison) 
health workers and administrators participated in exit 
interviews (Table 2). Intervention district key informants 
were descriptively older (mean of 31.4 vs. 23 years in the 
comparison) and had worked in their current position longer 
(mean of 6 vs. 1.5 years in the comparison). For the two 
facility leads in the comparison district, this was their first 
health position.
Implementation of Performance-Based Financing Intervention 
(Objective 1)
In order to evaluate implementation of the PBF intervention, 
we assessed how engaged workers were in the goals setting 
process, the proportion of goals achieved, the process of 
incentive disbursement, how appropriate those incentives 
were, and how the incentives were used. 
Engagement in the Goal-Setting: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Data
Although we saw no difference in the three goal-related 
constructs at endline, exit interviews suggested that workers 
in the intervention district displayed a clearer understanding 
of their goals than those in the comparison. Participant 
satisfaction with the goal-setting and evaluation processes 
were mixed across both intervention and comparison 
facilities; some workers felt it was sufficiently participatory 
while others wanted more participation and a few wanted 
monthly (and not quarterly) evaluation.
Staff turnover created a lack of continuity in leadership that 
impacted intervention facilities’ abilities to implement the 
PBF. For example, observation revealed that the leader of the 
large peripheral facility who was very engaged in the PBF 
Table 2. Participants in the PBF Intervention, by Health Worker Cadre, Type of Data Collecteda, and District
 Intervention District Comparison District
Health Worker Cadre
Participant 
Observation
Surveys
Exit 
Interviews
Participant 
Observation
Surveys
Exit 
Interviews
Health systems administrators 2 - 2 2 - -
MCH health facility staff 18 18 2 10 10 3
Other clinical facility staff (eg, physician, técnico, pharmacist) 50 23 4 18 17 -
Non-clinical facility staff (eg, receptionist, cleaner, data analyst) 12 8 - 8 7 -
Total 82 49 8 38 34 3
Abbreviations: PBF, performance-based financing; MCH, maternal and child health.
a Participants in participant observation represent maximum number of health workers. Of these, some participated in the surveys and some who were key 
stakeholders participated in the exit interviews.
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design and early implementation was transferred during 
the intervention. Similarly, after the departure of the only 
nurse at the small peripheral facility, a rotation of nurses and 
midwives staffed that facility throughout the intervention. In 
exit interviews, two participants described how workers who 
joined the facilities after the intervention had started were 
unclear on the goals and not as invested. 
Proportion of Goals Achieved and Amount of Incentives Earned
The intervention district fully achieved 37% of their total 
goal opportunities and the comparison district fully achieved 
43% (Table 4). There was no difference in goal attainment for 
proportion of goals achieved per indicator by intervention 
status. Based on the proportion of fully (n = 22) and partially 
achieved (n = 12) goals, the intervention district earned 
45.1% (US$8111) of total funds possible. The District Health 
Authority were awarded a corresponding 41.5% of their 
maximum of $900 incentives for a total of $373.5 over the 
12-month implementation.
Process of Performance-Based Financing Disbursement
PBF disbursements were significantly delayed in the 
intervention district. There was an initial one-month delay 
in internal processing of incentives from CARE to the 
District Health Authority, followed by challenges for facility 
management of incentive funds, as facilities could not open a 
bank account. Consequently, disbursement of incentives to the 
large health facility in the district capital (and personal cash 
incentives to workers) earned for Quarters 1 and 2 occurred 
early in Quarter 3. The first disbursement occurred later, 
in Quarter 4 for the peripheral facilities, after a committee 
member was elected to open a personal bank account to store 
the PBF funds. Quarter 3 incentives arrived late into Quarter 
4 for all facilities. 
Table 3. Demographics for All Health Facility Workers Who Participated in Longitudinal Surveys on Workplace Characteristics, by PBF Intervention Status
Demographic Characteristic 
Facility-Based Staff
P ValueaIntervention Comparison
(n = 47)  (n = 34)
Female 64% 62%
Age (mean ± SD) 30 ± 9.5 29.0 ± 7.4
Single 87% 79%
Live with partner 36% 37%
Have children 68% 58%
Number of children (mean ± SD) 1.6 ± 2.4 1.2 ± 1.4
Total number in household (mean ± SD) 4.7 ± 4.7 4.7 ± 3.1
   Number adults in household (mean ± SD) 3.2 ± 2.4 3.2 ± 2.5
   Number children in household (mean ± SD) 1.8 ± 2.5 1.6 ± 1.5
Local origin (same or neighboring districts) 31% 25%
Years lived in community currently serving (mean ± SD) 5.1 ± 7.0 7.4 ± 10.8
Number languages spoken (mean ± SD) 2.9 + 1.0 3.8 + 1.1 <.001
Christian 94% 94%
Clinical facility staff 72% 74%
Workers providing PVT services 36% 29%
Education
   Primary school (1-5 years) 3% 4%
   Secondary school (6-10 years) 47% 29%
   University prep (11-12 years) 50% 68%
Months training (mean ± SD) 25.1 + 23.4 24.6 + 14.1
   Months training (clinician only) 29.8 + 23.3 27.8 + 11.6
Months work experience (mean ± SD) 74.3 + 100.1 49.2 + 79.3
    Months work experience (clinician) 78.9 + 110.4 36.2 + 61.9 <.01  
    Median (range) months of work experience (clinician) 27.5 (2, 420) 18.0 (0.25, 252) <.01  
Abbreviations: PBF, performance-based financing; PVT, prevention of vertical transmission of HIV.
a P value refers to differences between intervention and comparison groups within the same cadre.
Table 4. Number and Proportion of Goals (n = 60)a Achieved Among Health Facilities Participating in a PBF Intervention in Mozambique
Reached 
Goalb         
Intervention District Comparison District
Large District 
Health Center
Large Peripheral 
Health Center
Small Peripheral 
Health Center Total
Large District 
Health Center
Small Peripheral 
Health Center
 Small Peripheral 
Health Center Total
Yes 8 (40%) 7 (35%) 7 (35%) 22 (37%) 10 (50%) 8 (40%) 8 (40%) 26 (43%)
Partially 5 (25%) 5 (25%) 2 (10%) 12 (20%) 7 (35%) 3 (15%) 0 (0%) 10 (17%)
No 7 (35%) 8 (40%) 11 (55%) 26 (43%) 3 (15%) 9 (40%) 12 (60%) 24 (40%)
Abbreviation: PBF, performance-based financing.
a Five goals/facility x 4 quarters = 20 opportunities to achieve goals per each health facility, and 60 opportunities to achieve goals per district across the three 
health facilities.
b Goal is 10% increase above baseline.
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The most significant barrier to disbursement was leadership 
transitions. First, signing power was not transferred to 
the new financial administrator, which delayed incentive 
disbursements for the second and third quarters. Then, 
incentives to peripheral facilities were further delayed amid 
transitions of facility leaders and administrator vacation, which 
frustrated not only health workers but other administrators, 
as reported in the exit interviews. The small peripheral facility 
faced the additional challenges of remote location and lack of 
transportation to use incentives to purchase items for facility 
improvements. 
Incentive Appropriateness and Disbursement (Intervention 
Workers Only)
At endline, 40% of workers in the intervention district 
surveyed felt that the incentive amount was appropriate, 
and 33% were neutral. The mean response for the construct 
“incentives and collegial support help to improve service 
delivery” differed significantly by health facility (P = .03), 
with stronger agreement from workers at the small facility 
(4.2 ± 1.0) and slight disagreement at the other facilities (2.9 
± 1.2) on the 1-5 Likert-type scale. Incentives were delayed 
in reaching the health facilities, with length of delay varying 
by facility. At the time of the endline survey, facility-based 
workers at the small health center had recently received three 
quarters of personal incentives at one time, likely supporting 
their more positive response. 
Use of Incentives
Across the three intervention facilities, half (45%) of PBF 
incentives earned were directed to workers as personal 
incentives, and the majority of the remainder was strategically 
allocated to incentivize women to attend the facilities for 
services (Figure 3). The district and large peripheral facilities 
opted to use incentives for infrastructure for the Quarter 1 
and only allotted personal financial incentives starting in the 
second quarter. Across the three facilities, 15% of funds were 
allocated to improvements to the maternity ward (eg, privacy 
curtains, lamps, personal soap), maternity waiting facilities 
(eg, locks, electricity), and snacks for peer support groups for 
HIV-infected mothers. Another 13% were allocated towards 
improving sanitation and hygiene, including materials 
(eg, buckets, laundry soap) and new latrines close to the 
maternity ward. Fuel was used to support mobile clinics in the 
community, with a focus on HIV testing and antenatal care. 
In addition, the District Health Authority spent its incentives 
on iron frames for the windows to increase office security.
Impact of PBF on Motivation, Work Environment, and Job 
Satisfaction and Thoughts of Leaving (Objective 2)
Results From Quantitative Surveys
Ten composite constructs emerged from the factor analysis 
of the longitudinal surveys that had acceptable internal 
consistency and were important to the conceptual framework 
(Table S2). For extrinsic motivation, satisfaction with 
remuneration held together as a construct but recognition 
from others did not, and so recognition from health workers, 
partners, and community were assessed as individual items. 
No composite construct for intrinsic motivation emerged, 
and so three key intrinsic motivation items (enjoys work, 
contributes to improving conditions in the community, 
improves health behaviors in a positive direction) were 
assessed individually. Motivating supervision and structured 
supervision emerged as composite constructs. Lack of 
resources affecting work was included for maternal and child 
health nurses and midwives only to reflect the focus of the 
intervention. Composite constructs of collegial support and 
training did not meet the alpha check, so two key aspects 
of training, adequate training and frequency of refresher 
training, were analyzed as individual items. Job satisfaction, 
feeling secure in job, frequency of thoughts of leaving, and 
desire to leave if other options were available were analyzed 
as single items. Composite and single item constructs are 
reported below in sections that map onto the conceptual 
framework (Figure 1).
Extrinsic Motivation
Satisfaction with remuneration. At baseline, all workers were 
Figure 3. The Allocation of the PBF Funds Earned by the Three Intervention Facilities. Abbreviation: PBF, performance-based financing.
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slightly dissatisfied with their compensation and there was 
no detectable change as a function of PBF in the longitudinal 
surveys (Figure 4, Table S3). 
Social recognition. At baseline, workers strongly agreed 
that they were receiving respect from the community and 
NGO partners, and this did not change as function of the 
intervention (Figure 4, Table S3). However, comparison 
workers reported a marginally significant decrease (P = .08) 
in feeling respected by other health workers relative to 
intervention workers at midline.
Intrinsic Motivation
Health workers in both districts demonstrated high baseline 
levels of intrinsic motivation, as measured by three individual 
variables: the worker feeling he or she was contributing to 
improving health behaviors in a positive direction, improving 
conditions in the community, and enjoyment of work (Figure 
4, Table S3). PBF had no detectable effect on these intrinsic 
motivation items.
Resources
Baseline quantitative surveys showed that resource shortages 
sometimes affected health workers’ ability to deliver care, and 
there was no PBF effect over the course of the intervention 
(Figure 5). Qualitative data from the quarterly meetings 
identified that during the intervention stock-outs of HIV 
rapid and CD4 tests, amoxicillin, paracetamol, and Nevirapine 
occurred. 
Supervision
Structured and motivating supervision were higher among 
intervention workers at baseline. While no PBF effect was 
observed on motivating supervision, satisfaction with 
structured supervision increased among comparison 
workers over the course of the intervention with no change 
among intervention workers (Figure 5, Table S3). However, 
Figure 4. Motivation Constructs (Composite Satisfaction With Remuneration and Individual Items) as Predicted by PBF, Time, and PBF*Time Interaction for 
Facility-Based Health Workers in a PBF Intervention. Y-axis depicts constructs on 1-5 Likert-type scale. Abbreviation: PBF, performance-based financing.
qualitative data from quarterly meetings and exit interviews 
shows that intervention facility and maternal and child health 
leaders felt that PBF led them to be more engaged supervisors 
and concerned about their facility’s performance.
Job Satisfaction and Thoughts of Leaving
Job satisfaction and feeling secure in one’s job were high at 
baseline and no change was detected over the course of the 
PBF intervention (Figure 6, Table S3). However, there was 
a decrease in desire to leave if other options were available 
among intervention workers relative to comparison workers 
at midline relative to baseline (P = .003) and an increase in 
frequency of thoughts of leaving at endline but no intervention 
effect.
Additional Constructs
We found no effects of PBF on knowledge for PVT (data not 
shown), appropriate workload, and feeling adequately trained 
at endline compared with baseline (Figure 7). Workers in 
both districts generally felt prepared for their jobs, were 
neutral about their workload, and were slightly dissatisfied 
with frequency of refresher trainings. Time spent by nurses 
on antenatal and post-natal consults increased in comparison 
facilities but remained steady in intervention facilities.
Qualitative Results
Our qualitative data yielded analysis on collegial support, 
empowerment, and administrative support. 
Collegial Support
In qualitative data from quarterly meetings and exit interviews, 
the majority of respondents from intervention facilities 
reported experiencing more collegial support to achieve goals 
compared with respondents from non-intervention facilities. 
An illustrative example is an intervention nurse reporting 
that “colleagues were really focused on maternal and child 
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health [sector], so they all were worried and asking…‘how 
are we doing on our goals?’” MCH nurse, exit interview]. 
Workers from other parts of the facility reported increasing 
referrals of pregnant women to the maternal and child health 
sector. 
In qualitative data from quarterly meetings and exit 
interviews, some health workers reported concern about 
“free riders,” or individuals who benefited from incentives but 
did not significantly contribute effort. In the endline survey, 
19% of facility workers in the intervention district reported 
concern that group incentives would make some colleagues 
lazy and 16% were neutral. This manifested in debates for how 
incentives should be shared, as reported in an exit interview: 
“There were workers who received lots of complaints about 
their services, and when it was time to share the [incentives], 
some workers wanted to give less to those workers, arguing 
that they have a poor collaboration in the activities. They 
Figure 7. Other Workplace Environment Constructs not Central to 
Conceptual Framework, as Predicted by PBF, Time, and PBF*Time 
Interaction for Facility-Based Health Workers in a PBF Intervention. Y-axis 
depicts individual items on 1-5 Likert-type scale, with the exception of time 
spent (assigned score). Abbreviation: PBF, performance-based financing.
thought these workers shouldn’t receive the same amount, 
since some workers leave at 5 p.m. or 6 p.m. and others at 
3 p.m. for instance….at the end, after an intense debate, 
most workers agreed that the amount should be the same for 
everybody…and if the workers would give stronger effort to 
their activities, there would be no problem” [Facility leader, 
exit interview].
Administrative Support
The intervention facilities received mixed support from 
district administration. Intervention administrators were 
engaged in developing the PBF intervention and subsequent 
meetings. However, health workers reported that there was 
a lack of leadership in addressing obstacles that had plagued 
the district before and during the PBF intervention. On-going 
observation and reports from exit interviews identified stock-
outs of medications, HIV tests, and cooking supplies for the 
facilities and mismanagement of fuel allotments as chronic 
problems. 
Empowerment and Accountability 
The PBF intervention empowered facility workers through 
autonomy to prioritize facility-specific issues and to address 
implementation barriers. During an intervention planning 
meeting, a facility leader reported that this was her first 
opportunity to be involved in prioritizing facility needs. 
Another facility leader noted that the group goals led health 
workers to “start to see by themselves what was working or not, 
and what they could do to improve it in order to receive their 
[incentive] amount. That was a way of giving…autonomy. And 
that’s a good thing” [Facility leader, exit interview]. 
In addition to their own engagement, PBF encouraged 
workers and facility leaders to look for greater accountability 
from district administrators. For example, health workers 
initiated a process that resulted in the removal of an ineffective 
and obstructionist administrator after that official’s actions 
affected the Quarter 1 of PBF earnings and disbursement. 
Another example was a facility leader leveraging disclosure 
Figure 5. Workplace Environment Constructs as Predicted by PBF, Time, 
and PBF*Time Interaction for Facility-Based Health Workers in a PBF 
Intervention. Y-axis depicts composite constructs on 1-5 Likert-type scale. 
Abbreviation: PBF, performance-based financing.
Figure 6. Job Satisfaction, Feeling Secure in Job, Frequency of Thoughts 
of Leaving, and Desire to Leave as Predicted by PBF, Time, and PBF*Time 
Interaction for Facility-Based Health Workers. Y-axis depicts individual 
items on 1-5 Likert-type scale, with the exception of thoughts of leaving 
(yes or no). Abbreviation: PBF, performance-based financing.
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of PBF funds used for items that should have been covered 
by the district, until the district administrator promised to 
properly allocate these items for the next quarter (Quarter 3 
leadership meeting).
Discussion
We described the process, experiences and constraints 
in the implementation of a PBF intervention to improve 
delivery of PVT services (objective 1) and evaluated the 
longitudinal impact of PBF on health worker motivation, 
workplace environment, job satisfaction, and desire to 
leave (objective 2). Our evaluation of this small, proof-of-
concept PBF intervention revealed that implementation 
fidelity was compromised by administrative barriers, delayed 
disbursement of incentives, and poor timing of evaluation 
measures with incentive disbursement. At the facility level, 
we found that PBF increased collegial support, worker 
empowerment, and decreased desire to leave in a time of 
transitioning funding and implementing partners. 
Our analyses adds to the growing literature on the importance 
of careful PBF implementation and its evaluation in parsing out 
intervention effects. We confirmed that increased autonomy 
in deciding how to use funds was motivating and contributed 
to workers’ empowerment, which has similarly manifested 
among hospital management in Rwanda,50 facility workers 
in Nigeria,51 and supply chain workers in Mozambique.52 
However, the challenges encountered when implementing a 
new and different system such as PBF suggest that significant 
time is needed to streamline processes. For example, the 
delay in incentive disbursement in this intervention might 
have been resolved over a longer implementation period, as 
well as with more intensive up-front investment. Elsewhere 
in Mozambique, a large-scale PBF intervention took 1.5 
years of implementation to begin to see impacts of PBF on 
PVT service delivery indicators.53 Smooth implementation 
of PBF interventions are important, as PBF evaluations in 
Uganda and Tanzania suggest that deviations from planned 
implementation that lessen the “dose” of the intervention and 
may negatively affect the motivational pathway.54,55 
This study’s most valuable finding may be the ways in which 
the PBF led facility workers to demand accountability from the 
health system administration, impacting both implementation 
and workplace environment. Health worker participation in 
design and implementation of PBF initiatives such as this one 
contributes to feelings of ownership and fulfillment of the 
multiple dimensions of health worker motivation including 
its autonomous source, feeling valued, and satisfaction with 
demonstration of competence.7 This suggests that evaluating 
the multiple dimensions of motivation, specifically the 
ones reinforced by the autonomy and empowerment that 
can be introduced by PBF packages, has the potential to 
lead health workers to challenge some systemic barriers 
that otherwise are somewhat accepted as the status quo. 
Health workers advocating for change from the bottom-up 
supports the potential for broadening functional leadership 
in highly centralized and hierarchical health systems.56 This 
is a self-reinforcing feedback look, as autonomous sources 
of motivation are posited to lead to increases in worker 
performance in the context of PBF.6
Our findings of increasing collegial support towards goal 
achievement for intervention workers and the increase in 
structured supervision received by comparison workers 
adds to the growing body of literature on the PBF package 
strengthens health systems. PBF success in the Mozambican 
supply chain was due, in part, to enhanced teamwork.52 
However, concerns about non-contributing health workers 
benefitting from the personal financial incentives rewards 
remains problematic, in our study and in the literature. This 
“free riding” is a commonly cited source of concern for PBF 
interventions,53 although contrary evidence has also been 
reported.54 Increased supervision that comes as part of the 
package of PBF interventions directly motivated health 
workers in Benin39 and were a source of pride for health 
workers in Nigeria.51 The additional monitoring that comes 
with PBF evaluation may have led to the observed increase in 
satisfaction with structured supervision among comparison 
workers, with no increase among intervention workers who 
were already well-satisfied. This in turn may have contributed 
to increased completeness of services per consult, which was 
unmeasured, and contributed to the increase in amount of 
time spent per consultation among comparison workers at 
endline compared to baseline. 
Furthermore, our findings add to the limited literature of 
PBF impacts on attrition. PBF has been shown to decrease 
attrition among nurses and administrators in Zambia.23 While 
we recognize the conceptual distinctions between frequency 
of thoughts of leaving, intention to leave, and attrition, we 
believe our findings that PBF buffered against increased 
thoughts of leaving is valuable in the context of the severe 
health worker shortage in Mozambique. 
We did not observe the positive impacts hypothesized in other 
parts of our conceptual framework, including extrinsic or 
intrinsic motivation. This may be because motivation was high 
among both intervention and comparison workers. However, 
careful attention to timing of evaluation measures with 
respect to incentive disbursement may better capture impact 
of incentives on motivation and workplace environment 
constructs. Due to delays in incentive disbursements and 
focus on maintaining the planned timeline of midline and 
endline assessments, we may have missed changes in extrinsic 
motivational or satisfaction with goal attainment. Timing 
quantitative and qualitative assessments to assess constructs 
prior to and after review of achievement and incentive 
disbursement may help to isolate the impacts of PBF on these 
constructs, and give a clearer picture of how these constructs 
interact to impact healthcare delivery. 
This paper sought to respond to calls in the PBF literature 
for theory-based, mixed methods evaluations to generate 
more knowledge of the pathway by which PBF impacts 
health worker performance. Recent evaluations of innovative 
financing initiatives have moved the field towards this 
goal with inclusion of the PBF conceptual frameworks and 
incorporation of key qualitative insights.54,55,57 We have learned 
a number of lessons in the implementation and evaluation 
of this PBF intervention that we believe are pertinent to 
advancing the field. 
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Through our evaluation, it became clear that measuring 
quantity of services delivered would not necessarily 
capture changes in health worker performance in this PBF 
intervention, if indeed present. We had chosen to incentivize 
quantity of services delivered based on their importance in 
capturing women’s movement through the cascade of PVT 
services and their widespread and successful use in early 
large-scale, PBF interventions.29,58 However, our evaluation 
of this small-scale pilot underscored how the service delivery 
indicators were not proximally responsive to the incentives, 
that too many intermediary steps in our conceptual framework 
remained unmeasured, and no impact was observed on other 
hypothesized intermediaries. For example, the number of 
PVT services delivered relies heavily on maternal attendance 
at health facilities, which is influenced by a multitude of 
opportunity challenges in the woman’s life unrelated to care 
delivered by health workers. And while two of the facilities 
directed PBF funds to items that would incentivize women’s 
uptake of facility care (eg, privacy curtains, soap, electricity, 
etc), effects of these incentives on maternal attendance 
would not be immediate and were further exacerbated by 
administrative delay. 
Instead, meaningful quality and process indicators may have 
been more appropriate. Quality indicators are increasingly 
used in PBF interventions as the incentivized indicators or as 
weights applied to quantity-focused goals to determine final 
PBF fund values.50,58-60 Process indicators that may help to build 
accountability52 may more directly capture health workers’ 
performance if they are in areas within health worker control. 
In the context of PVT, better indicators to incentive may have 
included quality or completeness of counseling for adherence 
to medications, care during delivery, counseling on infant 
and young child feeding, and linkage with community-based 
care. However, attention must be paid to ensure these process 
and quality indicators are meaningful and will contribute to 
improved process and clinical outcomes, as opposed to the 
structural quality indicators that are commonly employed in 
PBF evaluations (eg, latrine and fence presence and upkeep, 
timely reporting).61 
Strengths and Limitations
Our study strengths included a basis on a theoretical 
conceptual framework, participatory design approach, 
and mixed methods evaluation. Another strength was the 
implementation of the PBF intervention in health facilities 
that reflects the current health system by: using existing 
national health system and PEPFAR infrastructure, investing 
very little prior to the intervention, and working on a modest 
budget compared with PBF initiative budgets 3-4 magnitudes 
greater.39,50,58 Therefore, the intervention was implemented in 
the low-resource facilities typical of the system in which most 
Mozambican women receive PVT care and illustrates positive 
intervention effects and the implementation issues that 
require attention in such situations. Finally, we documented 
how earned incentives were allocated by facility committees 
in ways intended to improve quality and facilitate retention 
of women in the cascade of care. This is an important part 
of implementation as incentive use can have time lag effects. 
We nonetheless had important limitations. In this pilot study, 
we prioritized choosing a comparison district demographically 
and geographically similar to that of the intervention and 
matched individual facilities on size and patient volume, but 
still intervention clinicans had more years of work experience 
than clinicians in the comparison district. As years of nursing 
experience is associated with greater empowerment among 
nurses,62 intervention health workers may have contributed 
to a facilitity environment primed for operational autonomy 
and leadership in respect to comparison facilities with 
workers who more recently completed training. This may 
have contributed to the positive effects of PBF on worker 
empowerment. 
Our proof-of-concept study was limited by the small number 
of health facilities (n = 6) and the corresponding number of 
workers (total n = 116, surveyed n = 83). The resultant low 
power for the survey data (60% for a large effect size of 0.7) 
meant that we were unable to look at how the constructs 
interacted with each other on the pathway to service delivery, 
and that we may have been unable to detect small and 
medium effects. However, the values from the Likert-type 
reponses for the non-significant constructs (eg, intrinsic 
motivation, extrinsic motivation, lack of resources, motivating 
supervision, job satisfaction) are similar between intervention 
and comparison workers so that even a significant effect would 
not necessarily be relevant in a service delivery context. 
The survey that measured health worker motivation and 
workplace constructs was adapted from a survey used with 
community health workers. While this survey reflected 
constructs that we had identified in our formative work, it may 
not have best captured the ways in which PBF impacted these. 
Low Chronbach α for some of the composite constructs (eg, 
intrinsic motivation, collegial support) led to their non-use in 
longitudinal modeling in favor of individual items. For future 
studies, we recommend recognition of the multidimensional 
nature of motivation into our quantitative tools and move 
beyond the intrinsic vs. extrinsic dichotomy. While our 
evaluation did not detect distortions – eg, items of intrinsic 
motivation and social recognition started and remained 
high among workers in both districts and satisfaction with 
compensation started low and remained somewhat low - this 
may reflect the low power of our analyses.
Finally, due to resource limitations the data were not 
independently validated by checking with service recipients. 
Although PBF introduce concerns about gaming and 
manipulation of reporting,63 we believe this bias was unlikely 
since we did not see a difference in goal attainment by PBF 
treatment. Furthermore, recent scholarship has shown that 
community verifications generate unintended consequences 
affecting the work environment of the verifiers, loss of patient 
confidentiality, and inter-personal strife.64
Conclusion
Evaluation of this proof-of-concept PBF implementation 
and its impact on intermediary constructs to service 
delivery demonstrate that PBF affects key aspects of the 
workplace environment, including collegial support, worker 
empowerment, and desire to leave. A large-scale study design 
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that evaluates the interactions of motivation and intermediary 
workplace constructs can help to better ascertain how PBF 
leads to changes in service delivery, and ultimately, health 
impact. Incentivizing a combination of meaningful process, 
quality, and service indicators that are more proximally 
responsive to health worker behavior may help to elucidate 
how PBF impacts the pathway to service delivery.
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